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Introduction
For a small economy, maintaining a pres-
ence on the global stage is challenging. New
Zealand (NZ), however, is not a country to be
left behind. After seeing venture-capital-backed
firms across the globe achieve public listings
sooner, experience faster growth, have higher
revenues, and stimulate economic activity, NZ
has created a fledgling venture capital1 (VC)
market of its own. (“Venture Capital Fund . . .”)
Albeit in its early stages of development, NZ’s
venture capital market has the potential to both
create private wealth and to contribute to wider
social benefits in NZ. VC encourages innovation
while assisting in commercializing the results
of research and development — both of which
lead to economic growth. With its societal
benefits and its alignment with NZ’s policy strat-
egy for long-term sustainable growth, venture
capital has taken a front seat in the NZ gov-
ernment’s growth and innovation framework.
Building a thriving VC market in NZ has
only recently become a government priority, and
as a result New Zealand’s VC investment levels
are still relatively low. As of 2006 venture cap-
ital in NZ as a percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) was 0.05 percent, compared to 0.12
percent for the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) top
quartile. Figure 1 shows the immaturity of New
Zealand’s venture capital market, comparing NZ
with worldwide trends from 2003–2005. (“OECD
Science . . . ,” pp. 142–43) Confirming the
market’s youth, NZ Venture Investment Fund
Chairman Peter Taylor stated in 2007: 
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1Venture capital, often classified as a subset of private
equity, is equity investment in privately held high-risk high-
growth firms — firms too small or too immature to raise
public capital or to secure bank loans. Venture capitalists
invest alongside management when firms are in their
seed, start-up, or early-expansion phases of development,
with the intent of producing a return later through an
initial public offering or company trade sale.
Despite the excellent progress to date,
the industry is in its formative years. . . .
For New Zealand to create a venture cap-
ital industry that is on par with similar
OECD countries, we believe requires a
threefold increase in the size of the indus-
try, including both expertise and funds
under management. Until that occurs,
many promising New Zealand businesses
with high growth potential will struggle to
attract capital from within New Zealand.
(“NZVIF Annual Report 2007,” p. 4) 
In short, progress is being made, but NZ’s ven-
ture capital industry remains immature relative
to world standards.
In this article I assess the status of NZ’s
venture capital market, examining the indus-
try’s recent accomplishments, its most pertinent
challenges, and its potential for future devel-
opment. In the first section I discuss the VC
market’s recent performance and the impact
of the global financial crisis. I then examine the
structural and cultural barriers affecting the
market and explore the limitations that these
obstacles place on VC’s ability to fuel significant
economic growth. In the final section I sug-
gest opportunities for positive change and
conclude that to promote and support VC the
government needs to focus on developing the
whole financial system, rather than simply
depending on VC to lead the way.
Building an Industry: Recent
Developments in NZ’s Venture
Capital Market
Venture capital in New Zealand is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. The VC industry was
not established until 2002, when it gained
governmental support. Although the govern-
ment has encouraged VC investment in the past,
creating the Development Finance Corporation
in 1964 and the Greenstone Fund in 1993,
neither project was able to successfully launch
an organized VC market. (Lerner et al., pp. 64–65)
Throughout the 1990s, the VC market had
limited funds, little available information, and
regulations that were not aligned with global
standards. To address both the gap in the provi-
sion of capital and expertise for early stage high-
growth companies and the VC market’s minute
size, the government took action in 2002, estab-
lishing both the Venture Investment Fund (VIF)
venture capital program and the New Zealand
Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF). The VIF is a
venture capital investment program to which
the government has contributed $160 million
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Figure 1
2003–05 Trends in Venture Capital Investment 
As a Percentage of GDP
1. Numbers for Japan and Korea are from 2001; for Iceland, 2002. For European countries, total venture capital investment includes
early-stage, expansion, buy-outs, and other sectors.
Source: “OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007.”
for investment alongside of private sector co-
investors. The NZVIF is the VIF’s investment
manager, created for the primary purpose of
helping develop the VC industry while over-
seeing the VIF. Since its inception the NZVIF
has been a catalyst for the emerging VC market,
bringing organization, stimulating funding, and
promoting progress. With the NZVIF’s help, the
industry’s total VC investment levels experi-
enced steady growth between 2002 and 2006, as
displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2, however, also
reveals a leveling off. Total investment levels
increased by only 8 percent in 2007 and actu-
ally declined by 19 percent in 2008, compared
to annual increases of 26 percent in 2005 and
21 percent in 2006. Furthermore, during 2007
and continuing through 2008, VC deal volume
slipped by 19 percent. Limited capital was
invested in new deals, and no significant divest-
ments2 occurred, as global credit markets dried
up and access was reduced due to spiking prices.
(“The New Zealand Private Equity and Venture
Capital Monitor 2008,” pp. 5–6) Thus, despite
initial optimism and success, the recent global
credit and liquidity crunch has threatened to
disrupt the progress of an already struggling
industry.
The timing of the global financial crisis has
also had negative implications for NZ’s ven-
ture capital market. Fiscal years 2007–2008 sig-
naled the end of active investing for many of the
VIF’s initial funds. The managers are thereby
approaching a significant point, where they
are looking to divest initial investments and
raise funds for the next stage in the invest-
ment cycle. As noted by NZ Venture Capital
Association Chairman Hamish Bell, “These suc-
cesses are important in both demonstrating the
value these investors bring to the table and in
broadening investor interest in the asset class.”
(Bell) Investors need to know that there are exit
opportunities from invested companies in order
to feel confident that their investment will
produce a profitable return; thus in NZ investors
need to see funds seeded in 2002–2003 produce
favorable returns to feel secure about commit-
ting to further investments. The tightening in
the global credit markets, however, is reduc-
ing the VC market’s ability to raise capital and
establish exit investments and is thereby chal-
lenging continued development.
59
2Divestments are synonymous with exits — the times
when an investor cashes out from an invested company,
either through an initial public offering or through an
acquisition, and realizes a return or profit.
Figure 2
Venture Capital Investment Summary
Source: “The New Zealand Private Equity and Venture Capital Monitor 2008.”
In addition to interfering with exit oppor-
tunities and reducing the performance of NZ’s
market, the financial crisis is also deterring firm
investment, resulting in reduced VC investment
opportunities. NZ businesses are facing higher
financing costs, tighter credit terms, and greater
difficulties obtaining new financing. (Jensen, 
p. 11) The NZ Venture Capital Association
(NZVCA) has reported that “the [global] situa-
tion is concerning enough to be characterized
as a capital markets crisis for the start-up
community.” (“No Venture-Backed . . .”) With
predictions that investment pressures will
increase in 2009, there may be a prolonged
period of slow growth in firm investment and
thus stagnant growth in the VC community.
(Jensen, p. 11)
External Challenges
The volatile global economy is only one
of many external barriers challenging New
Zealand’s VC industry. New Zealand’s trifling
domestic savings levels and underdeveloped cap-
ital markets are negatively influencing the VC
market’s growth potential, while a lack of for-
eign investment and limited domestic investor
diversity are making development increas-
ingly difficult. Altogether, the cards are stacked
against NZ’s venture capital market.
A Lack of Domestic Savings
At the heart of NZ’s problems is a lack of
domestic savings. NZ’s savings rate is well below
the OECD average — and declining — sug-
gesting that NZ may not have the capital nec-
essary for its VC industry to fuel economic
growth or reach sustainability. Savings fell from
4 percent of national disposable income in
2005 to 1.6 percent in 2006, and both direct
equity and indirect equity3 holdings are low.
Direct equity holdings account for less than 4
percent of assets, compared to 17 percent in
the U.S., 9 percent in France, and 6 percent in
Australia. (Bollard) With the financial channels,
such as banks, institutions, and pensions,
responsible for transferring money across the
business sectors not receiving investments, there
is less capital in the financial markets — and
therefore fewer funds in the VC market. 
The Underdeveloped Capital Markets
Further complicating the problems asso-
ciated with a lack of domestic savings are NZ’s
underdeveloped capital markets. Quality finan-
cial systems are essential for VC investment
growth, as they channel capital to the firms that
put forward attractive returns. Efficient markets
also provide the infrastructure for processing
entrepreneurs’ capital demands by mobilizing
savings and allocating credit. NZ’s capital mar-
kets, however, are thin — the consequence of
unbalanced growth and a large external deficit,
both of which stem from low domestic savings
and strong inflation pressures. (“The OECD Pol-
icy Brief . . . ,” p. 11) 
Although NZ’s banking sector is aligned
with some of the world’s greatest economies,
capital markets are interconnected; and NZ’s
debt, VC, and equity markets are not mature
in size, depth, liquidity, or worker skill base.
To begin with, the domestic corporate bond
market is thin; at less than 5 percent of GDP,
it falls short of the OECD’s average 39 per-
cent. (“Deepening . . . ,” p. 86) One reason for
this is high interest rates. Kiwis pay progres-
sively higher bond interest rates than those in
other OECD countries, causing high costs of
capital while curbing investment at the margin,
and thus limiting VC opportunity. (“The OECD
Policy Brief . . .” p. 11) 
Like the domestic bond market, NZ’s secu-
rities market is immature. As portrayed in
Figure 3, NZ’s stock market capitalization is
around 40 percent of GDP, well below the
OECD’s average of 65 percent. The small size
of the securities market suggests that NZ will
not provide invested firms with an exit route.
(“Deepening . . . ,” p. 86) With only 174 firms
listed on the main NZ Stock Exchange, 29 on
the Alternative Market,4 and 47 with publicly
listed debt, it is clear that a significant propor-
tion of NZ enterprise is unlisted, indicating that
a vibrant VC market is essential for investors
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3Direct equity refers to equity investment made inde-
pendently by an investor. Indirect equity refers to equity
investment made through a third party, such as a finan-
cial intermediary, superannuation fund, or other managed
fund.
4The Alternative Market is designed for small to
medium high-growth companies.
to take advantage of the economy’s key driv-
ers. (“Deepening . . . ,” p. 96)
Given NZ’s underdeveloped capital mar-
kets, however, a thriving VC market may not
be achievable. Without the support of a robust
financial system, VC becomes increasingly risky,
as weak capital markets limit both public and
private exit opportunities. Exit or divestment
opportunities from invested firms are important
because they provide venture capitalists with a
return on their investments; a lack of such
channels reduces investment liquidity and
increases associated risk, ultimately causing
risk-averse investors to turn away from VC.
Without the structure of an established finan-
cial system and a well-defined stock market to
assist efficient growth and development, the VC
community will not reach a size where high-
growth firms have funding access — at least not
in the near future — and even then, the VC mar-
ket most likely will neither reach sustainabil-
ity nor evolve into a significant economic leader.
Lack of Foreign Investment Interest
In addition to not having the domestic
financial market structure necessary to support
a thriving VC community, NZ’s venture capital
market is also not attracting necessary offshore
funding, as displayed in Figure 4. As of 2006
fewer than four percent of international
investors were interested in exploring NZ’s mar-
ket, due in part to NZ’s isolated location, the
small size of many of NZ’s funds, and NZ’s
economic structure, as well as a global per-
ception that investment in New Zealand VC
funds is unwise. (“Global Trends . . . ,” p. 42)
Continued failure to attract offshore investment
will further limit the availability of capital in the
VC market, causing some VC portfolio compa-
nies to fail due to a lack of funding, while
restricting the VC industry’s growth capacity.
(“The New Zealand Private Equity . . . ,” p. 20)
However, with only limited research, a lack 
of a favorable returns record, and limited
national interest, changing the global com-
munity’s negative opinion is difficult. (Lerner et
al., pp. 108–109) 
One of the most basic factors deterring
global investors from New Zealand’s VC mar-
ket is NZ’s geographical location. When provid-
ing VC funds, it is important for the investor
to be relatively close to the portfolio company
to monitor the invested company’s daily devel-
opment. Without a local presence, foreign
investors face a disadvantage relative to the
locals in analyzing potential investment oppor-
tunities, particularly since information is not
easily standardized or assessed remotely. With
its isolated geographical location, NZ’s ability to
attract international investment into the VC
market outside of Australia may be limited. 
The size of New Zealand’s VC funds also
diminishes offshore interest. In 2005 many of
NZ’s funds were only about $50 million, which
after administration costs are considered sug-
gests that foreign investment in NZ is not
practical. (Lerner et al., p. 108) To put NZ’s fund
size into a global context, British VC funds in
2002 averaged over $900 million, Japanese funds
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Figure 3
Market Capitalization of Listed Stocks as a Percentage of Annual GDP: 
2002–2006
Source: “Private Equity and Venture Capital in New Zealand: A Snapshot at September 2008.”
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about $115 million, and Israeli funds $73 mil-
lion. Not only are the amounts of capital larger,
but these other funds also do not have extensive
travel and transaction costs. (Mayer et al., p. 10)
So despite growth, New Zealand VC funds are
simply not large enough to attract the attention
of the major players. This places the VC indus-
try in a difficult position. Offshore investment
is a critical ingredient for achieving individ-
ual portfolio size and depth, as well as for devel-
oping New Zealand’s domestic VC market; 
however, it is the VC market’s small size that
is a key deterrent to attracting foreign investor’s
attention.
Offshore investors are also wary of invest-
ing in NZ due to underlying macroeconomic
factors. In 2006 NZ had a current account deficit
of over 9 percent of GDP, which contributed
to its having the second highest international
liabilities ratio in the OECD at over 80 per-
cent of GDP. (“Deepening . . . ,” pp. 11, 87)
NZ’s indebtedness is indicative of its poor
national savings levels and has become partic-
ularly significant with the deepening of the
global recession. High debt levels make NZ sus-
ceptible to foreign investor shifts in sentiment
and risk profiles, compounded by the fact that
NZ’s external liabilities consist mainly of short-
term debts. (“Deepening . . . ,” p. 87) In Decem-
ber 2008, the NZ dollar had fallen 35 percent
from February 2008, mirrored by the NZSE50’s
37 percent plummet from May 2007. (Jensen, 
p. 2) In short, offshore investors may be uncom-
fortable with the NZ market’s volatility, fur-
ther limiting NZ’s ability to attract foreign
investment. 
Limited Domestic Investor Diversity
As with the lack of international invest-
ment interest, research indicates that New
Zealand’s VC industry is also not attracting
the necessary range of domestic investors, as
illustrated in Figure 4. To begin with, the figure
reveals heavy reliance on government fund-
ing, a feature common during the initial devel-
opment of a VC market. (Lerner et al., p. 61)
Global trends, however, suggest that contin-
ued dependence on government funding
inhibits a VC market’s ability to reach sustain-
ability. It is important to note that govern-
ment funding is low in Europe and non-existent
in the U.S. Yet the combination of a limited
amount of domestic capital available in NZ’s
economy for VC investment and a lack of inter-
national interest may result in New Zealand’s
VC market always having to rely on government
funding. 
Figure 4
NZ Venture Capital Funds — Investor Base 2006
Source: “New Zealand Venture Capital 2011.”
Figure 4 also illustrates the virtual absence
of institutional investors, such as fund-of-funds5
and pension funds, in New Zealand’s VC market.
Institutions generally represent a key source
of funding for VC communities. Banks are
important to VC in Germany, corporations in
Israel, insurance companies in Japan, and pen-
sion funds in the U.S. and U.K. Australia pro-
jected in 2006 that over 55 percent of VC and
private equity (PE) investment was sourced
from institutional investors. (“NZVIF Annual
Report 2007,” p. 8) Estimates in 2007, however,
suggest that NZ institutions accounted for only
20 percent of VC and PE funds. Thus it appears
that NZ’s venture capital market is not receiv-
ing the funding and support of an important cat-
egory of investors, a group that often plays a sig-
nificant role in the development of a sustainable
and mature market.
In addition to a lack of participation
among institutions, there is also a large differ-
ence between the amount that NZ and foreign
institutions commit to VC. In 2005 the aver-
age strategic portfolio investment allocation
of endowment and pension funds in private
equity was 4.5 percent in Europe, 6.3 percent in
Australia, and 8.2 percent in North America.
(Tregaskis, pp. 11–12) Melville Weaver’s 2007
survey, however, found that NZ institutional
fund managers allocated an average of less than
1.8 percent of funds to private equity, of which
allocations were often concentrated in a small
number of funds investing offshore. (Tregaskis,
p. 12) In view of the more mature VC industries’
heavy reliance on institutional investment, NZ
will not be able to sustain the growth and devel-
opment of its fledgling VC market with only the
minimal contributions of a few institutions. 
The reasons that institutions are turning
away from VC include a lack of capital and
VC’s illiquid nature. Research on NZ institu-
tions’ asset allocations by the NZVIF during
2006–2007 revealed that the NZ institutional
investment market is small. The majority of NZ
institutions had less than $5 billion of assets;
and of New Zealand’s 576 registered superannu-
ation funds, only 77 had assets larger than
$50 million. (Tregaskis, pp. 12–13) When NZ
pension fund assets and life insurance invest-
ments as a percentage of GDP were compared
to other OECD countries, NZ was fourth from
the bottom of the rankings. (“Deepening . . . ,”
p. 89) Overall, the small size of NZ institu-
tions suggests that institutions have a lack of
funds to dedicate toward VC and a lack of
resources for employing in-house VC expert-
ise. (Palmer)
VC’s inherent illiquidity is another con-
cern for institutional investors. Investment
products in NZ have early redemption options
that allow investors to remove capital on
demand. This retail nature forces managers to
allocate a large percentage of capital to more liq-
uid assets to account for potential redemptions.
Investing in VC is thereby difficult because VC
requires a long-term investment, which limits
a manager’s ability to withdraw capital early.
Including a high percentage of long-term assets
or VC thus generates volatility in a portfolio’s
liquidity, because early conversions of liquid
assets increases the percent of capital dedicated
to VC, which reduces the ability to provide
future early redemptions. Without more long-
term plans, the need to maintain a liquid port-
folio will limit NZ institutional investment in
VC. (Tregaskis, p. 12) 
Internal and Cultural Barriers
In addition to the many external barriers
impeding the development of New Zealand’s VC
market, internal growth barriers are also preva-
lent. One example is inexperienced fund man-
agers. Venture capitalists are not matching
firm’s investment expectations, creating inter-
nal tension among participants and contribut-
ing to the lack of international and local sup-
port. According to LECG Consulting’s 2005
Report, “Inexperience is prevalent. . . . Almost
every [survey] participant cited ‘experience’ as
a significant barrier to growth.” (Lerner et al.,
p. 92) There is a lack of alternative investment
understanding among both investors and man-
agers and limited resources for accessing invest-
ment opportunities. (“NZVIF Annual Report
2007,” p. 8) Until managers gain investing expe-
rience and earn a respected reputation, the VC
industry faces the challenge of providing an
acceptable service to firms.
A cultural barrier also exists in NZ, pres-
ent in the self-imposed glass ceiling referred
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5A fund-of-funds is an investment fund that holds a
portfolio of other VC funds rather than investing in individ-
ual high-growth firms. (“NZ Private Equity . . .”)
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to as the “Three B’s.” The “Bach, Boat, and
BMW” mentality is a cultural tendency for Kiwis
to grow their business to a set sales level, gen-
erally to several million dollars, and then lose
interest in further development. (Bollard)
According to Waikato University academic Ed
Vos:
Nine out of ten of these [small and
medium enterprises (SMEs)] just want
to be happy and see chasing an extra dol-
lar by growing their business as getting in
the way of that pursuit. . . . They expand to
a self-imposed plateau . . . then content-
edly trundle in their BMWs, taking holi-
days in their baches6 and making waves
in their boats. (Vos, as quoted in Booker
and Hurman) 
Consistent with Vos’s assertion, a Massey Uni-
versity survey confirmed that SMEs valued
stability and quality of life over firm growth.
(Booker and Hurman) Such apathy toward firm
growth suggests that Kiwis are not pursuing
innovative ventures or growth initiatives —
an unfavorable situation for NZ’s venture cap-
ital community because these are the pursuits
that rely on VC funding. The “OECD Reviews
of Innovation Policy New Zealand” recom-
mended that the NZ government use tax incen-
tives to move SMEs beyond the “Three B’s.”
(“OECD Reviews . . . ,” p. 94) Such indiffer-
ence is difficult to change, however, because it
is part of NZ’s psyche; but with only two percent
of SMEs interested in high growth and achieve-
ment, the Three B’s mentality has far-reach-
ing implications for both the economy and
the VC industry. (Booker and Hurman)
The Investment Environment:
Recent Regulatory Changes
One way that NZ can begin to address
the aforementioned challenges while also sup-
porting VC development is for NZ policymakers
to create an investment environment conducive
to alternative investment. Since the release of
LECG’s 2005 report — which identified unfa-
vorable tax and regulatory policies as hindering
the development of the VC market — legislation
has been introduced to encourage business
investment, innovation, and savings. With
regard to improving the wider investment mar-
ket, a business tax reform package was enacted
for the 2008–2009 tax year. The reform package
cut company tax rates, reduced domestic sav-
ings vehicles tax rates (including those of super-
annuation schemes, unit trusts, and other man-
aged funds), and installed a 15 percent R&D tax
credit. The most promising legislation for the
New Zealand VC investment environment, how-
ever, was the passing of the Limited Partnership7
Bill in May 2008. Introducing limited partner-
ships removed the largest regulatory barrier
to attracting foreign funding, while demonstrat-
ing the government’s commitment to promot-
ing the investment community’s development.
(“Incentives . . .”)
An additional policy initiative that will pos-
itively affect the VC industry occurred in April
2008 with the implementation of KiwiSaver, a
voluntary private contributory saving scheme
discussed in Andrew Remis’s essay in this vol-
ume. KiwiSaver may increase both national sav-
ings and household savings of financial assets.
These in turn would increase domestic capi-
tal, reduce NZ’s high cost of capital, and stim-
ulate business investment, thereby creating
VC opportunities. In addition, as a pension
scheme KiwiSaver funds can be invested in
less liquid long-term assets, such as VC. Invest-
ment by KiwiSaver in VC would diversify the VC
market’s investor base while also expanding the
amount of capital available to the VC industry.
In the long term, KiwiSaver may alleviate the
current shortage of domestic capital available
for VC funding, thereby helping to provide the
tools to create a mature VC industry.
Policy changes have also been occurring
in the VC industry. When the NZVIF’s venture
capital program was established, it matched pri-
vate sector seed funding and start-up investors’
investment at a 1:2 ratio; the ratio is now 1:1.
The increased fund commitment should help
attract additional private capital into the mar-
ket, while also increasing the speed with which
committed funds are invested. As NZ’s Eco-
nomic Development Minister Trevor Mallard
stated:
6“Baches” are small vacation or beach homes in
New Zealand.
7Limited partnerships (LP) are the international stan-
dard legal and tax structure for VC investment. In an LP, the
limited partner’s exposure to firm debt is limited to the
amount of money the limited partner has invested in the
firm.
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The changes to VIF were important if VC
was to continue to contribute to New
Zealand’s economic transformation into a
high-wage export-led and innovative econ-
omy. The initial investment momentum
generated by VIF has slowed and it appears
the current structure is not attractive
enough to encourage further private
investment co-investment in new VIF
funds. (Mallard) 
In short, NZVIF’s new investment mandate
should generate a greater flow of capital into the
VC market, allowing a greater number of firms
to receive funding while also sustaining growth.
Domestic Prospects for the Future: 
A Fund-of-Funds Investment Vehicle
In addition to re-evaluating its current
policy, NZ can also improve the investment
environment by implementing a fund-of-funds
(FOF) venture capital investment vehicle (see
footnote 5). NZVIF research has verified insti-
tutional interest in a NZ Private Equity FOF,
an unlisted PE investment product targeting
domestic investors. FOFs are attractive to
both larger institutions and to smaller investors
with limited resources. They address scale issues
by pooling capital, manage risk through diver-
sification, and address NZ funds’ liquidity needs
by enabling investors to stagger investments
into multiple FOF products. (Palmer) Private
equity FOFs give investors exposure to the
unlisted sector and access to diversified port-
folios without investors having to employ a
costly investment program, providing an attrac-
tive solution for institutions, offshore investors,
and wealthy individuals interested in the VC
market. In short, such an investment vehicle
would provide new investors with the tools to
capitalize on the VC industry, bringing a greater
flow of capital and investors to the VC com-
munity. (“NZ Private Equity . . .”)
Establishing a FOF was at the top of the
NZVIF’s agenda for 2008–2009. The NZVIF
began addressing the FOF structure, with plans
to launch it in 2008; however, the poor domes-
tic economy and struggling global market inter-
fered. In 2008 the FOF was put on hold, with no
plans of resuming implementation until the
investment climate improves. (“Statement of
Intent . . .”) Although stalled, the FOF must not
be forgotten, as it will enable access to and
participation in the VC market by important
domestic investors.
A Trans-Tasman Approach
In addition to domestic initiatives, there
are also opportunities for global endeavors. For
example, NZ needs to determine whether con-
tinuing to build an independent VC market is
its best option. Moving forward, NZ’s VC indus-
try should consider developing a comprehen-
sive partnership with the Australian market.
Collaboration would give NZ the scale and
resources to enjoy the associated benefits of a
mature VC industry, benefits that NZ may not
be able to bring about alone. Investment lev-
els from NZ into Australia and vice versa have
increased since 2003, suggesting that strength-
ening financial ties through shared ventures
would be both viable and beneficial. (Bascand)
Furthermore, of the highly developed economies,
entrepreneurial activity rates are highest in
Oceania (i.e., Australia and New Zealand).
(Autio, p. 12) With NZ already considered to
be a part of the larger Australasian market,
establishing a joint market with Australia may
be the solution to the difficulties facing New
Zealand’s VC industry.
The advantages of a joint market extend to
both countries. For New Zealand’s VC market,
access to Australia’s wide investor base, which
includes pension funds and FOFs, would provide
NZ with a more diversified investor base. A more
diversified investor base is favorable because it
increases available funding, provides investors
to match already committed capital, and reduces
heavy reliance on other domestic investor
groups. Combining markets would also expand
NZ’s investment networks and contacts, bring-
ing experienced fund managers and investor
confidence to NZ’s venture capital community.
Overcoming the basic hurdles present in the
market’s youth would allow NZ to capitalize
on the benefits of a thriving VC market. 
Collaboration benefits apply to Australia
as well. Australia’s VC market is at the lower end
of OECD countries with respect to VC invested
as a percent of GDP and is feeling the full
force of the 2008 global financial recession. For
example, Australia’s biotech sector is suffering
from a funds crisis, with private investment cap-
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ital falling 80 percent during 2008. (Cress-
well) NZ’s biotech community, on the other
hand, received over 50 percent of all NZ venture
capital funds in 2008 and 25 percent of gov-
ernment research funding, both larger shares
than in the U.S. or Europe. (Giovanetti and
Jaggi) A joint market — and access to additional
funding — would thus put Australia’s VC com-
munity on a playing field closer to international
expectations.
Altogether, a joint VC market would aug-
ment the scale of both markets, attract interna-
tional funding, bring greater flows of capital,
enable access to a wider spectrum of firms,
and further diversify the investor base of both
markets. Additionally, both Australia and NZ
would gain the resources to be able to provide
firms with funding access throughout the busi-
ness cycle. In short, the advantages promoted
by trans-Tasman VC collaboration suggest that
it would be attractive to both countries. 
The Free Trade Agreement with China
As does Australia, China also offers oppor-
tunity for New Zealand’s VC market. China is an
international funding hotbed, and NZ has an
opportunity to capitalize on China’s VC mar-
ket by taking advantage of the recent Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) between the two countries,
discussed in detail in Stuart Schnabolk’s essay
in this volume. In addition to enabling Chi-
nese technology to be commercialized in NZ,
provisions of the FTA relative to NZ’s VC mar-
ket include establishment of both national treat-
ment and most-favored-nation (MFN) non-
discrimination status with respect to market
access and protection for investment, as well
as agreement to free transfer of funds. National
treatment alleviates the intellectual property
and quality control issues that NZ firms had pre-
viously faced in China by committing China
to providing NZ investments with treatment and
protection equal to that of Chinese nationals.
Alleviating these issues made business expan-
sion into China more attractive while also
increasing the demand for VC to sponsor such
growth. MFN nondiscrimination status is also
desirable as it guarantees that market access and
investment protection will remain at the high-
est standards, enabling continued VC invest-
ments in China in the future. Such status guar-
antees that, if China should offer more favorable
investment treatment to a third country than
what is currently extended to NZ, the treatment
will also apply to NZ. In other words, NZ has
secured and will continue to be granted the
most favorable investment treatment offered by
China. Like MFN non-discrimination status, free
transfer of investment funds is also beneficial
for New Zealand’s VC community. Unlike West-
ern countries, China taxes offshore fund gains
at higher rates than it taxes domestic funds.
(Pukthuanthong and Walker, p. 723) Free trans-
fer of funds means that NZ firms will no longer
face capital gains taxes, giving NZ firms and the
VC industry an advantage over much of the
global community.
One way that the VC community can cap-
italize on access to China is by forming syndi-
cates with Chinese VC firms. The FTA has
already encouraged the New Zealand VC firm
Endeavour Capital and the Chinese VC firm
Wuhan Huagong Venture Capital Company to
form a syndicate. The deal requires that each
company contribute $50 million for science and
technology investment in both NZ and China.
The syndicate is the first of its kind, but illus-
trates that collaboration between VC firms in
both countries is possible. (“Venture Capital
Firm . . .”) Syndicates between Chinese and
NZ firms benefit NZ’s venture capital commu-
nity by bringing access to additional capital and
by expanding venture capitalists’ exit opportu-
nities and could offer an alternative means for
expanding NZ’s domestic venture capital indus-
try in the future.
NZ also needs to advertise Chinese oppor-
tunities to the global VC community to attract
foreign satellite offices. The FTA’s provisions
make NZ an attractive location for foreign VC
firms to set up headquarters for Asian invest-
ment. Establishing a local office in NZ removes
the capital gains tax faced by offshore investors
and diminishes long-distance investment prob-
lems, due to NZ’s geographical proximity to
China. Having offshore investors use NZ as a
base for Chinese investment benefits the New
Zealand VC market because it will bring addi-
tional capital to the economy, some of which
should then flow into VC. In short, the oppor-
tunities created from relations with China have
the potential to greatly assist the VC market’s
development.
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Conclusion
The NZ government’s recent implementa-
tion of the NZVIF and dedicated focus to
improving the investment environment have
been invaluable, resulting in the VC community
experiencing initial growth. It will be a long and
difficult road, however, before New Zealand
VC is on par with global standards and can
provide the benefits of a thriving VC market.
As stated by LECG Consulting’s 2005 study,
“Interviewees were concerned that even if New
Zealand venture capital grew significantly and
performed well, it would inevitably be difficult
(or nearly impossible) to outperform other
international countries.” (Lerner et al., p. 92)
Distance from major markets makes keeping the
international connections essential to innova-
tion and growth difficult, while domestically the
combination of institutions’ reluctance to invest
in VC and entrepreneurs’ preference for a
“lifestyle business” under the conditions of
the “Three B’s” are significant hurdles to build-
ing a mature VC market. 
Adding to already difficult conditions are
the underdeveloped capital markets and their
components, which ultimately may be the
largest constraint on the VC market’s develop-
ment. The NZ stock market lacks breadth and
depth, its domestic bond market is illiquid,
and Kiwis pay high bond interest rates relative
to other OECD countries. NZ needs a deeper and
more sophisticated financial system — markets
that can offer the comprehensive menu of serv-
ices that firms require, including providing
the channels for firms to raise funds and pursue
the commercialization of innovative ideas —
if the VC industry is expected to reach its full
potential.
Moving forward, the VC industry should
continue to improve the investment environ-
ment. Even with positive change, however, the
challenges ahead suggest that the VC market
is not going to be the strategic element for stim-
ulating NZ’s economy nor the leader for devel-
oping the capital markets. Instead, due to the
many difficulties inhibiting the VC market’s
expansion, NZ’s venture capital industry will
only reach its own potential as the other finan-
cial market segments align with international
standards as well.
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Introduction
New Zealand’s immigration policy has
undergone important changes in the past sev-
eral years. The 1990s saw short-lived surges
amounting to the highest net migration gains
in over one hundred years (the so-called “Asian
invasion” of the mid-1990s), some of the high-
est net migration losses of New Zealanders on
record (the oft-noted “brain drain” of the late
1990s), and belated recognition that much of
what is called “permanent and long-term migra-
tion” is not, in fact, permanent or long-term
at all. (Bedford et al., p. 1)
New Zealand’s future economic success
is uncertain because it lacks within its current
population some of the labor and technologi-
cal skills needed to sustain economic growth. It
is necessary, then, that it maintain an immigra-
tion policy that works to import these skills, log-
ically from its skilled neighbors: Asians and
Pacific Islanders. New Zealand has been and
continues to be largely accepting of peoples
from the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Canada. However, New Zealand remains
constantly uninviting to the “others” — its
Asian neighbors — despite the considerable
skills that they possess. Even though its immi-
gration policies and initiatives have changed
to no longer prohibit Asian immigration, atti-
tudes toward settlement have not. It is because
of this latent xenophobia that New Zealand’s
immigration policy is arguably the country’s
most contentious social issue. Each shift in pol-
icy has been met with harsh anti-immigration
backlash and debate. (Grbic, p. 1) In fact, the
unintended consequence of two immigration
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acts that were passed in the late 1980s and early
1990s was to effectively restrict immigration
policy.
In the last few decades, the composition of
immigrants in New Zealand has shifted away
from traditional source countries and toward
individual applicants with skills that can bene-
fit New Zealand’s economy. (Winkelmann) By
the late 1980s, economists and government offi-
cials realized that, in order for New Zealand to
remain competitive in the global market, it
needed to import skilled workers. The Immigra-
tion Acts of 1987 and 1991 worked to solve
this skill shortage, bringing in immigrants from
all around the world under a modified open door
policy. More immigrants entered New Zealand
from countries whose immigrants were rarely
before seen in New Zealand — such as China,
India, and Japan. However, New Zealand’s covert
xenophobia was awakened with the passing of
the two immigration acts and continues as a
dominant force in today’s political life.
New Zealand’s xenophobia has stunted the
country both economically and socially. Gordon
McLauchlan, a prominent commentator from
the New Zealand Herald, notes that this “nerv-
ous xenophobia that afflicts island peoples”
has prevented New Zealand from truly devel-
oping as a country. He also argues that New
Zealand society “lacks diversity and size in the
modern world. We have an economy smaller
than many corporations in the United States and
Europe, smaller than many American invest-
ment funds — about the same size as the Coca-
Cola franchise in Biloxi.” (McLauchlan, quoted
in Bedford et al., p. 13)
This article attempts to explain how New
Zealand’s xenophobic immigration policies have
hindered its economic growth and development
in the global community. Following the 1987
and 1991 Immigration Acts that opened New
Zealand borders to non-traditional source coun-
tries, the record shows rising conflict between
native New Zealanders and “the others.” This
conflict has manifested itself in the rise of the
political party New Zealand First, as well as
through unfavorable media coverage of New
Zealand’s policies toward immigration and pub-
lic opinion toward immigration. In fact, today’s
immigration policy largely reflects the same
closed-door opinion that New Zealand has
held about foreigners for centuries.
A History of Immigration in 
New Zealand
New Zealand was first settled by the M–aori,
who arrived by canoe between 750 and 1350 AD
from various eastern Polynesian Islands.
Although the first European contact was not
made until the late eighteenth century, 
the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 established
British sovereignty over the country. (Winkel-
mann, p. 2) All British citizens were entitled
to unrestricted access into New Zealand, 
along with the status of “instant citizen.” No
legal or cultural distinctions were made 
between the British and New Zealand residents.
(Fleras and Spoonley, p. 152) The continuing
immigration of the British (and later their 
Irish neighbors) was aided by an unofficial
“white-only” immigration policy framework,
which was maintained until the late 1980s.
(Grbic, p. 2)
Between 1881 and 1921, more than eleven
acts were passed in New Zealand’s Parliament
with the express purpose of restricting the entry
of Chinese and other Asian “races.” (Fleras
and Spoonley, p. 159) In fact, New Zealand’s
early immigration policy made it legally possi-
ble for the country to keep out its Pacific Island
and Asian neighbors. Therefore, it was not
surprising that the 1921 census showed that 99
percent of New Zealand’s 1.2 million population,
excluding the M–aori population, claimed British
nationality. (Grbic, p. 2)
In the late 1800s while the country was
being settled, the New Zealand government
offered assisted passage schemes, by which
the government paid travel fares for immigrants
from the British Isles to move to New Zealand.
(Winkelmann) In the 1950s and 1960s, New
Zealand re-opened these assisted passage
schemes in an attempt to regain the previ-
ously substantial immigrant population from
the British Isles that was beginning to decrease
noticeably. While the overall net migration gain
remained relatively stable at 10 to 20 thou-
sand per year throughout the 1960s, these
annual flows constituted less than 1 percent
of the population at the time. Immigration
had thus become a relatively small component
of New Zealand’s population growth compared
to the early years of colonization. (Winkelmann,
p. 3)
70
A memorandum produced by the Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs in 1953 summarizes
New Zealand’s immigration policy at the time: 
Our immigration is based firmly on the
principle that we are and intend to remain
a country of European development. It is
inevitably discriminatory against Asians —
indeed against all persons who are not
wholly of European race and color.
Whereas we have done much to encourage
immigration from Europe, we do every-
thing to discourage from Asia. (Fleras and
Spoonley, p. 160)
Later on, during the 1970s and 1980s, tur-
bulent times began to characterize New
Zealand’s immigration policy. Ups and downs in
net migration flows occurred, the result of cycli-
cal changes in immigration policy decisions.
(Winkelmann) For example, a typical policy
cycle consisted of a promotion of immigration
during times of labor market shortages. How-
ever, delays between the recruitment and the
arrival of immigrants meant that immigrants
sometimes arrived after the labor shortage
disappeared. This produced hostile attitudes
towards immigrants in the native population
and a subsequent restriction of immigration.
(Winkelmann, p. 5) Furthermore, New Zealand’s
immigration policy had followed a traditional-
source-country list ever since the 1840s, but
after 1976 immigration became subject to
both an occupational priority list and to a pre-
ferred-source-country list. (Winkelmann, 
p. 11) The preferred-source-country list looked
much like New Zealand’s previous traditional-
source-country list, however. This meant that if
an employer wanted an immigrant from a coun-
try that was not on the preferred list, he had
to prove that it was impossible to acquire those
skills from one of New Zealand’s preferred-
source countries.
In 1986 a long-awaited review of immigra-
tion policy was introduced in Parliament by the
Labour Government. (Bedford et al., p. 6) With
the consequent passage of the Immigration
Act of 1987, race, culture, and national origin
were removed as criteria for immigrant selec-
tion, making New Zealand the last country in
the world founded by immigrants to discard
such discriminatory provisions. (Fleras and
Spoonley, p. 161) Moreover, by the early 1990s
official policy had identified Asian markets as
engines for growth, Asian investments as piv-
otal in internationalizing New Zealand’s econ-
omy, and Asian immigrants as catalysts for
expanding the country’s pool of human capi-
tal. (Fleras and Spoonley, p. 155) Asia had cut-
ting-edge technology, ongoing research, and
trained technicians that could greatly aid New
Zealand. But in order to gain access to Asia’s
technologies and investments, New Zealand had
to change its “white-only” immigration policy. 
In 1991 the Immigration Amendment
Act was passed and the current point system was
established. The new act granted entry into New
Zealand if an immigrant’s skills matched the
needs of the New Zealand economy. Since the
labor market had a relatively high proportion of
unskilled New Zealand-born workers, import-
ing skilled workers seemed a relatively inexpen-
sive and immediate way to overcome a shortage
of skilled labor. In theory, this change would
benefit both unskilled New Zealand-born per-
sons and, in particular, owners of New Zealand’s
capital. (Winkelmann, p. 18) 
The 1991 act established four main cate-
gories for obtaining permanent residence in
New Zealand: the General Skills, Business
Investment, Family, and Humanitarian cate-
gories. In 1996, 61 percent of all immigration
approvals came from the General Skills cate-
gory, 25 percent from the Family category, 10
percent from the Humanitarian category, and 4
percent from the Business Investment category.
This breakdown is different from that of most
countries (such as Australia) where family re-
unification is the major reason for migration.
Table 1 lists the elements of New Zealand’s Gen-
eral Skills point system, according to which
points are awarded depending on the character-
istics of the worker.2 In the category labeled
“Employability,” there are several different
factors. The factor “Work Experience” measures
how many years the applicant has been working
in his/her prospective field. The “Offer of
Employment” factor indicates whether or not
the immigrant applicant has received an offer
of employment in New Zealand prior to his/her
approval. The factor also assigns a point value
to the age of the applicant, with the age range
of 25–29 years being the “most desired.” In
the second column under “Qualifications” the
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applicant’s educational credentials are assessed.
Individuals who have attended a university or
who have continued on to receive a Masters or
PhD degree are awarded more points in this cat-
egory. In the “Settlement Factors” category,
more points are awarded if an immigrant is
judged to be easily able to adjust to a new life in
New Zealand. Partner qualifications are also
taken into account in this category in judging
whether the immigrant’s partner will also be
able to find work and have an easy transition.
The “Family Sponsorship” factor takes into
account whether an immigrant already has fam-
ily living in New Zealand and whether the
family is sponsoring its family member to come
to New Zealand. There are additional base qual-
ifications that must be met in New Zealand’s
point system, but generally speaking, immi-
grants had to maintain a minimum 25 points in
order to gain residency in New Zealand in the
General Skills category.
Judging by the evidence (e.g., see Win-
klemann and Winklemann, as well as the Hud-
son Report), the radically different policy was
considered to be quite successful, especially
since immigrants had significantly higher
education levels than the New Zealand-born
population. (Winkelmann, p. 18) Unlike in the
United States, where most immigrants are
low-skilled, in New Zealand immigrants (in
the 1990s) had much higher educational lev-
els than native born workers, with 44 percent of
immigrants in 1996, for example, having
obtained university degrees versus only 10
percent of the New Zealand-born. (Depart-
ment of Labour) Yet many New Zealand natives
did not seem to be concerned with the posi-
tive economic impact that these immigrants
would make; instead, they seemed more con-
cerned about their ethnicity. The resulting
boom in immigration from 1994–1996 became
controversial not only for its sheer magni-
tude, but also because of its composition. The
countries from which most immigration
requests were approved in 1996 included Tai-
wan, China, India, South Korea, Hong Kong,
Table 1
Summary of Points System in General Skills Category
Employability Qualifications
Work Experience Base Qualification 10
2 years 1 Advanced Qualification 11
4 years 2 Masters Degree or Higher 12
6 years 3
8 years 4 Settlement Factors
10 years 5 Settlement Funds
12 years 6 $100,000 1
14 years 7 $200,000 2
16 years 8 Partner’s qualification
18 years 9 Base qualification 1
20 years 10 Advanced qualification 2
New Zealand work experience
Offer of Employment 5 1 year 1
Age 2 years 2
18–24 years 8
25–29 years 10
30–34 years 8
18–39 years 6
8–44 years 4
18–49 years 2
Maximum Age: 55 years
Source: Winkelmann and Winkelmann.
Family Sponsorship 3
Maximum Settlement Points: 7
and the Philippines. And in the 1996 census, the
proportion of recently arrived foreign-born res-
idents from Asia was 47 percent. (Ho et al.) In
short, the new immigration policy was success-
ful in acquiring the much-needed skills for New
Zealand’s economy; yet the source countries
of recent immigrants were radically different
from those of any immigration initiative in
the past.
The Promulgation of Racism during
the 1990s
The 1987 and 1991 immigration acts were
an attempt to deal with New Zealand’s strug-
gle with the acceptance of “the other,” yet the
attitudes remained. New Zealand’s continued
xenophobic attitudes were expressed in a 1996
poll showing that 60 percent of New Zealanders
believed that it was necessary to reduce immi-
gration. (Fleras and Spoonley, p. 178) Likewise,
the lives of the immigrants themselves were
affected by such attitudes. According to an Auck-
land survey taken during the same year, one
in four immigrants felt “fairly or very unwel-
come,” while one in five was concerned about
“overt racism.” (Fleras and Spoonley, p. 187) 
Peters and New Zealand First
The most outspoken individual regard-
ing immigration policy has been Winston
Peters, leader of the New Zealand First party.
Under the headline “Whose Country Is It Any-
way?” Peters’ leaflets have railed against Asian
immigrants, falsely claiming that hundreds of
thousands of Asian immigrants are coming into
New Zealand and blaming them for, among
other things, traffic problems in Auckland.
These immigrants are, according to Peters, poor
enough to be leeches on the welfare system
yet rich enough to drive up the cost of housing.
(Fickling, p. 3) When the Malaysian prime min-
ister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad warned that
Peters’ opinions would be interpreted by Asian
countries as a sign that New Zealand did not
want to be a part of Asia, Peters stated that “New
Zealand was not part of Asia, nor did New
Zealanders want it to be.” (Peters, as quoted
in Miller, p. 206)
While radical opinions might take hold
in any political spectrum, New Zealand First is
not a political anomaly. It was the third-largest
party in Wellington’s Parliament; and, until
1999, Mr. Peters was the country’s deputy prime
minister. (Fickling, p. 2) In fact, Mr. Peters’ 1996
election-year immigration-policy platform
that would cap immigration at 10,000 per year
was later adopted as official New Zealand pol-
icy in December 1997.
Media Promotions of Racism during
the 1990s
During the period from 1993 to 2003,
several reports were put out that analyzed media
coverage of immigration in New Zealand. The
findings of these reports showed overwhelmingly
negative attitudes towards immigration, suggest-
ing that the content of the print media during
this time articulated certain stereotypical and
negative images about “Asian” immigrants.
(Spoonley and Trlin) Certain media phrases were
repeated over and over such as “Inv-Asian” and
“Asianisation” [of New Zealand], creating a
negative depiction of the immigration flows dur-
ing the late 1990s. The media also gave wide-
spread coverage to the views of Winston Peters
and New Zealand First. Peters himself focused
on certain negative aspects of immigration, such
as Asian driving habits or the pressures placed
on infrastructures and services (e.g., educa-
tion) by immigrants. (Spoonley and Trlin)
Ultimately, the media influence the way in
which political agendas are constructed and
understood, as well as the ways in which the
images and language of public and private
debates are formed. (Spoonley and Trlin, p. 11)
For New Zealand, a negative portrayal of immi-
gration was detrimental to the social cohesion
of the country. Many Kiwis bought into the New
Zealand First campaign, believing and spread-
ing the negative media stories on immigra-
tion, which in turn created more division within
the country.
Public Opinion Polls
In 1995 a survey3 was conducted to meas-
ure attitudes towards immigration. A total of
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3Survey conducted by Douglas Grbic and refer-
enced in his “Social and Cultural Meanings of Tolerance:
Immigration, Incorporation, and Identity in Aotearoa
New Zealand.” 
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1,043 New Zealanders were asked to rank their
stance on immigration based on five ques-
tions. The results were then compiled into a sin-
gle additive variable measuring anti-immigra-
tion sentiment. The possible values of the
variable ranged from 5 (extremely pro-immigra-
tion) to 25 (extremely anti-immigration). The
average response was 14.46. (Grbic, p. 7) Other
public opinion polls similarly found a strong dis-
like towards immigration, with one poll in
March 1996 revealing that 78 percent of New
Zealanders wanted the number of Asian immi-
grants reduced. (Miller, p. 206)
Discrimination toward Immigrants in
the Job Market during the 1990s
Public attitudes toward immigration
expressed in the media also extended to the
job market. Immigrants often complained of dis-
crimination in employment and of difficulties
in finding a job, despite their high skill levels
and certifications. Various employment stud-
ies indeed showed that Asian immigrants had
a lower probability of finding employment and
lower incomes, if employed, than New Zealand-
born workers of the same age and education.
(Winkelmann and Winkelmann, p. viii)
In each of the census years (1981, 1986,
1991, 1996, and 2001) disparities in educational
attainment between the immigrants and natives
were seen. (Winkelmann and Winkelmann) In
1996, for example, 44 percent of recent immi-
grants (36 percent in 2001) had university
degrees versus only 10 percent of the NZ-born
(12 percent in 2001). (Department of Labour, 
p. 6) Immigrants entering New Zealand in 1996
without any qualifications represented 23 per-
cent of the total population of all immigrants
(14 percent of recent immigrants), compared
with 30 percent of the New Zealand-born.
(Winkelmann and Winkelmann, p. vii) Over-
all, immigrants coming into New Zealand in the
late 1990s were much more likely to hold a uni-
versity qualification and, at the other end of the
spectrum, much less likely to have no qualifica-
tions than the native New Zealand population.
To a large degree, the employment pat-
terns appeared to depend not on skill or quali-
fication but on ethnicity and country-of-ori-
gin. For Pacific Islanders in the late 1980s,
employment opportunities were particularly
grim. In one study,4 Poot and his colleagues
show that in 1981 recent immigrants from
the UK, Australia, and North America had
unemployment rates that were relatively simi-
lar to those of the New Zealand-born. By con-
trast, unemployment rates among recent immi-
grants from the Pacific Islands were several
times higher than those of New Zealand-born
workers, as well as other immigrant groups.
(Winkelmann, “Immigration . . .”) Moreover,
unemployment rates of immigrants born in the
Pacific Islands appeared to take much longer to
converge to the unemployment rates of the New
Zealand-born (up to 15 years). (Winkelmann,
“Immigration . . .”) For Asians, employment
opportunities were also poor. Despite the fact
that Asian immigrants were entering New
Zealand with higher skill levels than the general
population, Asian immigrant unemployment
rates were very high. For example, in 2001 Asian
immigrant unemployment rates were about
18 percent, more than double that of the gen-
eral population (7.5 percent). (Ho et al.)
Income statistics also demonstrate a dis-
connect based on ethnicity and country-of-
origin. Zodgekar used 1991 census data to
find that immigrants from traditional source
countries such as the UK had much higher 
average incomes than immigrants from the
Pacific Islands and Asia. (Winkelmann, “Immi-
gration . . . ,” p. 17) Skilled Asian immigrants
had a particularly large initial income disadvan-
tage. For example, on average the income of a
25-year-old university Asian graduate even fell
short of the income of a native high-school
graduate. (Winkelmann and Winkelmann)
Further research showed that immigrants
from the UK and Ireland had higher participa-
tion rates, employment rates, and incomes than
other groups of workers, but that Asian and
Pacific Island immigrants who came in through
the Business Skills category tended to have less
favorable outcomes in each of these three areas,
despite their higher skill levels. (Winkelmann
and Winkelmann, p. viii) Overall, recent immi-
grants from Asia had the lowest full-time
employment rates among all recent immigrants
(including Pacific Islanders). Only 31 percent of
4Study conducted by Jacques Poot and referenced
in Liliana Winkelmann and Rainer Winkelmann’s “Immi-
grants in New Zealand: A Study of their Labour Market 
Outcomes.”
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recent Asian immigrants of working age were
employed in March 1996, compared to 76 per-
cent of recent UK immigrants. (Winkelmann
and Winkelmann, p. viii)
Why Is There Hostility?
Few issues are as likely to provoke and
divide New Zealanders as that of immigration.
For everyone who supports immigration as a
catalyst for sustainable growth and expanded
opportunities, there is someone who laments 
its eroding of the social and cultural fabric 
of New Zealand society. (Fleras and Spoonley, 
p. 175) There are many reasons why New
Zealanders are covertly, if not overtly, resist-
ant to multiculturalism and immigration. Below
I discuss four main social theories that might
explain this phenomenon.
One theory holds that individuals who suf-
fer the most from economic disadvantage tend
to view immigrants as a threat to their own
employment and job opportunities. Research
has shown that low socioeconomic status has
a strong positive association with anti-immigra-
tion sentiments. (Grbic, p. 3) Therefore, in the
local Kiwi context the lower the socioeconomic
status, the less tolerance individuals will have
for immigration. However, the fact that immi-
grants from traditional source countries are suc-
ceeding in New Zealand’s economy suggests that
this phenomenon cannot be explained by eco-
nomic disadvantage alone.
Another theory that might explain New
Zealand’s attitude toward immigrants stresses
the importance of size. To New Zealanders,
size is important; and for a country that is
slightly larger geographically than the UK
with a population only a quarter that of London
alone, smaller groups, factions, and opinions
can have a greater impact. (Move to New
Zealand, p. 1) In his macrosociological theory,
Blau defines social structure as a “multidi-
mensional space” of different social positions.
(As explained in Grbic, p. 4) Social positions are
differentiated by two forms — heterogeneity and
inequality. Heterogeneity is defined by struc-
tural parameters such as race and religion,
which determine the distribution of individuals
by social groups. On the other hand, inequal-
ity is defined by the degree of social distance
between individuals, such as income and edu-
cation. When there are few or no differences
within a group — that is, when there is little
heterogeneity and little inequality — the greater
is the status of “homophily,” love of the same,
as similar individuals tend to cluster together.
(Grbic, p. 4) In New Zealand, for the first two
hundred years of its existence, immigrants were
arriving from the same handful of European
countries. Therefore, homophily, love of the
same, could easily be established because the
commonalities among persons greatly out-
weighed the differences. However, with the
change in immigrant source countries and
the inflow of immigrants from very different
regions during the late 1980s and 1990s, there
were stark apparent differences that created
divided group associations.
A third theory as to why New Zealanders
are largely opposed to immigration is based
on their unique historical context. In the New
Zealand context, intergroup conflict, as Fleras
and Spoonley point out, arises from “fundamen-
tally different standpoints in the social hierar-
chy. . . . M–aori and P–akeh–a,5 as colonized and col-
onizer, tend to see the world differently, with
each arguing from positions that the other can-
not understand or accept because of differences
in social status.” (Fleras and Spoonley, as quoted
in Grbic, p. 4) This conflict between majority
and minority groups relates to new immigrants
in two ways. The majority group, the P–akeh–a,
will tend to be more anti-immigration since
they, as the dominant group, believe that minor-
ity groups should assimilate into their society.
(Grbic, p. 5) The P–akeh–a dominate New Zealand
quite visibly; and with new immigrants com-
ing from “colored skin” countries, assimila-
tion becomes much more difficult. Ironically,
the M–aori minority are also against immigra-
tion because they feel they are fighting their
own battle for recognition and biculturalism
in New Zealand. They believe that other out-
siders would dilute this M–aori presence.
Yet another social theory explaining New
Zealand’s hostility to outsiders is the theory of
national identity. National identity is a senti-
ment, form of culture, or social movement that
focuses on one’s own country. New Zealand,
an island country, was settled by two different
5The M–aori word to describe the British colonizers of
New Zealand.
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cultures: the M–aori and the P–akeh–a. Both cul-
tures are drastically different from one another
and came from opposite corners of the earth.
The P–akeh–a in the past had taken on the role
of colonizer, choosing to control and colonize
New Zealand and its M–aori people. In the 1980s,
the uneasy transition towards a post-colonial
biculturalism,6 a desire by the M–aori to be rec-
ognized with the P–akeh–a as original settlers of
New Zealand, and the expansion of non-tradi-
tional sources of immigration led many to
conclude that “New Zealand at the turn of the
millennium is experiencing a crisis of national
identity.” (Grbic, p. 3) As Fleras and Spoonley
state, “Debates over Asian immigration,
together with M–aori ori challenges to the status
quo, have shattered the complacency [New
Zealanders] once had by confronting New
Zealanders with the most basic of questions per-
taining to national identity: “Who are we?”
(Fleras and Spoonley, p. 152)
The founding of New Zealand dates back
centuries, but the original Treaty of Waitangi
is where most point to as the start of conflict.
In 1840 the Treaty of Waitangi established
British sovereignty over New Zealand, while it
also recognized the M–aori ownership of their
lands. Since the signing of this document, the
P–akeh–a and M–aori have argued and fought
continuously over power and recognition. M–aori
continue to fight for biculturalism — desiring
the recognition of two distinct settlement
groups in New Zealand — whereas the P–akeh–a
instead see New Zealand as the land of her
Majesty the Queen, striving to preserve its
purity. Put simply, the identity of New Zealand
has never been adequately addressed or defined.
Therefore, with the immigration policy shift
in the early 1990s and the introduction of other
cultures and ethnicities into New Zealand’s soci-
ety, there has been more public confusion and
outrage than ever before.
Current Immigration Policy
The changing ethnic composition result-
ing from the immigration boom of 1994–1996
brought substantial concern to New Zealand.
The unearthing of many hostile feelings left the
country in a moral dilemma that was not eas-
ily resolved. Once again, New Zealand adjusted
its policy in response to negative public opinion
through a series of stringent measures that
immediately halved immigration numbers.
(Fleras and Spoonley, p. 161) In October 1995,
policy was tightened to require minimum 
English language requirements, not just for the
principal applicant but also to all adult family
members (aged 16 and older) in both the Gen-
eral Skills and the Business Investor categories.
(Spoonley et al., “Tangata Tangata . . . ,” 
p. 124)
Furthermore, in occupations where pro-
fessional registration is required by law in
New Zealand (such as physicians, lawyers, and
electricians), immigrants must now pass the
professional requirement test before points for
these qualifications can be awarded. (Winkel-
mann, “Immigration . . . ,” p. 12) Since New
Zealand’s system of occupation regulation (e.g.,
certification, licensing) is modeled after the
British system, British, American, and other
Western European applicants were automati-
cally approved for immigration with practic-
ing licenses; but immigrants from Asia and
the Pacific Islands were not. By placing this reg-
istration requirement in the immigration pol-
icy, the government attempted to control where
immigrants came from. Thus, professional gov-
erning bodies can now politely but firmly refuse
to recognize formal qualifications for entry from
professionals they don’t want without it being
called a discriminatory policy. (Fleras and
Spoonley, p. 157) The policies thus make it more
difficult for Asian and Pacific Island people seek-
ing entry by barring them according to language
and registration without explicitly discrimi-
nating on the basis of ethnicity and country-
of-origin.
In December 1997 the decision to aim in
the future for an annual Permanent Long Term
(PLT) net gain of 10,000 immigrants was
announced by Parliament. This policy was cre-
ated in response to the campaign platform of
New Zealand First and Winston Peters, who
argued that there were too many immigrants in
New Zealand and that immigration was ruining
a “pure” New Zealand. The most recent change
in immigration policy, announced by the Prime
6Biculturalism is the idea that two cultures can co-
exist, usually despite a history of national or ethnic conflict.
The conflict usually arises as a consequence of colonial
settlement, although in the case of New Zealand the con-
flict is between rival groups of colonizers.
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Minister in July 2003, brings New Zealand’s
immigration policy back full circle. The Prime
Minister announced that the General Skills Cat-
egory would now be replaced with a new Skilled
Migrant Category (SMC). As sociologist Paul
Spoonley states, “Instead of being a passive
recipient of residence applications from peo-
ple who may or may not be successful settlers,
New Zealand will actively recruit those who
are needed and who are expected to settle well.”7
(Spoonley et al., “Tangata Tangata . . . ,” 
pp. 124–25) Therefore, the immigration policy
that began in the late nineteenth century as a
selective country-of-origin process today incor-
porates an “active recruiting process.” Given the
discriminatory employment environment that
many Asian and Pacific Island immigrants have
faced, it is no surprise that New Zealand is again
targeting such countries as Britain, Ireland, the
United States, and Canada — a return to the
“white-only” immigration policy seen a few
decades ago. New Zealand has spent centuries
attempting to find the “right” set of immigra-
tion policy filters and procedures to deter or
eliminate those who are not wanted and who “do
not fit.” Winston Peters has stood on his immi-
gration platform as leader of New Zealand First,
demanding harsher immigration laws. He has
stated that “the [New Zealand immigration] sys-
tem is like the proverbial sieve leaking undesir-
ables at will.” (Peters) Peters’ most recent immi-
gration policy initiative was the creation of an
“undesirables” category and a new agency 
dedicated solely to double-checking the immi-
gration papers of those who have already
entered the country, and then deporting those
immigrants whose paperwork may have been
overlooked before. (Scoop Independent News, 
p. 1)
Current Public Opinion
The current opinion polls and statistics
show that discrimination and xenophobia are
still very much alive in New Zealand today. A
study conducted by the research group UMR
in December 2008 revealed that over half of
respondents selected a race when asked which
group of people is generally most discriminated
against in New Zealand. In the same survey,
when respondents were asked to rank the levels
of discrimination, 74 percent of them said
that Asians were subject to “some” to “a great
deal” of discrimination. (Human Rights Com-
mission, “Treaty of Waitangi . . . ,” p. 13) In
the Human Rights Commission Race Rela-
tions Report of 2008, many respondents said
that they felt unhappy with people from China
because “too many are coming to New Zealand
and taking over New Zealanders’ space.” (Human
Rights Commission, “Tüi Tüi Tuituiä . . .”) The
Human Rights Commission report also con-
tained examples of documented hate crimes and
harassment. In several incidents, immigrants
were approached by people chanting “white is
good, yellow is bad” while staging the Nazi
salute. (Human Rights Commission, “Tüi Tüi
Tuituiä . . .” p. 25)
Similarly, a report published by the Hud-
son consulting group, “Employment and HR
Trends,” in December 2006 presented infor-
mation gathered from 1,705 interviews with
New Zealand employers and noted significant
employment barriers faced by immigrants.
(Hudson Report, p. 1) The report also pointed
out that, with unemployment in New Zealand
at historically low levels, a large number of busi-
nesses are having difficulty finding a sufficient
number of skilled workers. However, the report
finds that at the same time many New Zealand
companies are reluctant to make use of immi-
grant workers. Even though immigrant work-
ers who have entered New Zealand through
the Skilled Worker Category are highly trained
and qualified, they face unemployment rates
of more than 10 percent. Seventy-seven percent
of employers believe that there are barriers to
entry for immigrant workers; yet more than
fifty-six percent of employers found that their
company benefited from employing immigrants
and would employ immigrants again. (Hudson
Report) This contradiction between employers
struggling with a critical shortage of skilled tal-
ent while many are also showing reluctance to
take on workers from “non-traditional pools” is
the same contradiction we have seen in New
Zealand for the past two decades. The Hudson
Report concludes by saying that successful
settlement of immigrants requires successful
employment.
7According to current immigration policy, however,
the applicant must still pass a health, English language and
character requirement.
Conclusion: What Can Be Done 
about It?
Can New Zealand’s attitude toward immi-
gration change? The 1987 open-door immi-
gration policy exposed a flaw in New Zealand’s
ability to encompass diversity as a part of its
national identity. (Fleras and Spoonley, p. 152)
New Zealand’s economy has suffered from an
unwelcoming attitude towards immigrants, and
as a result economic growth has been affected.
New Zealand companies acknowledge that
they are in dire need of workers with higher
qualifications; yet those immigrants are rejected
because of their ethnic background. The “white-
only” immigration policy that New Zealand
strives for is its nemesis; and by looking only
in the mirror, New Zealand has lessened its
global presence.
The Department of Labour predicts that by
2021 one-quarter of the New Zealand workforce
will be overseas-born, one of the highest pro-
portions of immigrant workforces among coun-
tries in the Organisation for Economic Co-Oper-
ation and Development (OECD). While today
eight of ten workers are P–akeh–a New Zealanders,
by 2021 only two in three will be. It is ironic that
New Zealand, a tiny country in the South Pacific
with a population half the size of New York City,
is so dependent upon the rest of the world 
for goods to survive; yet it is so selective with
respect to whom it admits. As stated by Le
Heron and Pawson, “It remains to be seen
whether New Zealand can repair its relationship
with the Asian community at home and abroad;
after all, New Zealand remains a small, isolated,
and economically insignificant country that,
paradoxically, depends on Asia for its long-term
survival rather than vice versa.” (Le Heron
and Pawson)
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